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Aero Net Network Special Report: NORAD's Take On 9/11 Attacks, Part I
National Commission on September 11 Terrorist Attacks
It makes for chilling reading. The following is a transcript of testimonybefore the Commission by Maj. Gen. Craig
McKinley, Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold andCol. Alan Scott May 23, 2003, all current or retired Air Force Officers who
werebased at NORAD on Sept. 11, 2001.
NORAD Timeline
Col. Alan Scott
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Commissioners.  It is my pleasure to be here withyou today.  General Arnold and I
worked together that day on September 11th. What I will walk you through here is a chronology of the attacks and
Ipresented it in a matrix form.  And the only thing I lay claim to is having studiedall of the attacks and how they were
interwoven together.  This was not alinear sequence of events where one attack began and ended and then a second
attackbegan and ended.  This was a coordinated, well-planned attack.  We hadmultiple airplanes in the air.  The fog and
friction of war was evident everywherein the country both on the civil side as well as the military side. And
thishopefully will show you how those interwoven events came about.  I will tell youthat the times on this chart come
from our logs.  The time on the chart isthe time that's in the log.  It may not be the exact time the event happened. It
may be the time when the log keeper was advised or became aware of theevent.
The first thing that happened in the morning, related to, related to theevents at 9:02, or I'm sorry, 8:02 A.M., EST, is
when American Airlines 11 tookoff out of Boston.  American Airlines 11 was a 767 and it was headed, I believe,to Los
Angeles
Fourteen minutes later, also coming out of Boston Logan, United Airlines 175,a 757, also headed to Los Angeles, took
off out of Boston and initially tookroughly the same ground track as American 11.  Three minutes later
AmericanAirlines 77 took off out of Dulles here in Washington, also headed to LosAngeles and also a 757 and
proceeded westbound towards the West Coast.  So now thefirst three airplanes are airborne together.


The first time that anything untoward and this was gleaned from FAA responseand anything out of the ordinary
happened was at 8:20 when the electronictransponder in American Airlines 11 blinked off, if you will, just
disappearedfrom the screen. Obviously, the terrorists turned that transponder off and thatairplane, although it did not
disappear from the radar scope, it became a much,much more difficult target to discern for the controllers who now
only couldlook at the primary radar return off the airplane. That was at 8:20.  At 8:40,in our logs is the first occasion
where the FAA is reporting a possiblehijacking of American Airlines Flight 11.  And the initial response to us at
thattime was a possible hijacking; it had not been confirmed.


At that same moment, the F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base,Massachusetts, about 153 miles away were placed
immediately on battle stations by theNortheast Air Defense Sector Commander.
At 8:43, as this is going on, the fourth airplane, United 93 takes off out ofNewark, New Jersey.  It's a 757; it is headed
for San Francisco.
At 8:46, our next log event, we get the last and by the way, much of thisradar data for these primary targets was not
seen that day.  It was reconstructeddays later by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron and other agencies like itwho are
professionals at going back and looking at radar tapes and then giventhat they are loaded with knowledge after the fact,
they can go and find thingsthat perhaps were not visible during the event itself.


At 8:46, the last data, near the Trade Center.  8:46, the first impact on theTrade Center. At that minute is when the Otis
F-15s were scrambled and,again, they are 153 miles away.  And that scramble came and Gen. Arnold, I'm surecan
address this, based on the conversation between the Northeast SectorCommander and himself.
Those F-15s were airborne in six minutes.  That is well inside the time thatis allowed for them to get airborne.  But
because they were on battlestations, the pilots were in the cockpits ready to start engines, that scramble timewas
shortened by a significant amount of time.
At 8:53, that's a minute later, in the radar reconstruction, we are nowpicking up primary radar contacts off of the F-15s
out of Otis.
At 8:57, which is seven minutes after the first impact is according to ourlogs when the FAA reports the first impact.
And about this time is when CNNcoverage to the general public is beginning to appear on the TV, not of theimpact, but
of the burning tower shortly thereafter.  So, you can see what in themilitary, I'm sure you have heard us talk to the fog
and friction of war.  Andas the intensity increases, the lag tends to also increase for how quicklyinformation gets
passed.
At 9:02, United 175, the second airplane, which by the way, never turned offits transponder before impact, crashes into
the North Tower, at 9:02.  Thedistance of those fighters which had been scrambled out of Otis, at thatparticular point
they were still 71 miles away, about 8 minutes out and going veryfast.
At 9:05, FAA reports a possible hijack of United 175.  Again that's 3 minutesafter the impact in the Tower.  It's how
long it is taking now for theinformation to flow through the system to the command and control agencies andthrough
the command and control agencies to the pilots in the cockpits.
At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations just based on thegeneral situation, and the breaking news and the
general developing feeling aboutwhat's going on.  And about that same time, kind of way out in the west iswhen
American 77, which in the meantime has turned off its transponder and turnedleft back toward Washington, appears
back in radar coverage.  And myunderstanding is the FAA controllers now are beginning to pick up primary skin
paintson that airplane and they don't know exactly whether that is 77 and they areasking a lot of people whether it is,
including a C130 that's westbound towardOhio.


At 9:11, the FAA reports a crash into the South Tower.  You can see now thatlag time has increased from 7 minutes
from impact to report, and now it's 9minutes from impact to report and you can only imagine what's going on on
thefloors of the control centers around the country.
At 9:11, I just mentioned that, 9:16, now FAA reports a possible hijack ofUnited Flight 93, which is out in the Ohio
area.  That's the last flight that isgoing to impact the ground.
At 9:24, the FAA reports a possible hijack of 77.  That's some time afterthey had been tracking its primary target.  And
at that moment as well is whenthe Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley.
At 9:25, American 77 is reported heading toward Washington, D.C., not exactlyprecise information, just general
information, across the chat log.
9:27, Boston FAA reports a fifth aircraft missing, Delta Flight 89. And youpeople have never heard of Delta Flight 89.
We call that the first red herringof the day because there are a number of reported possible hijackings thatunfolded over
the hours immediately following the actual attack.  Delta 89 wasnot hijacked.  It enters the system.  It increases the fog
and friction, if youwill, as we begin to look for that.  But he lands about 7 or 8 minutes laterand clears out of the
system.
At 9:30, that Langley F-16s are airborne.  They are 105 miles away from theWashington area.
At 9:34, through chat, FAA is unable to precisely locate American AirlinesFlight 77.
At 9:35, F-16s are reported airborne.  And many times, reported airborne isnot exactly when they took off, it's just
when the report came down that theywere airborne.
At 9:37, we have the last radar data near the Pentagon and 9:40, immediatelyfollowing that, is when 93 up North turns
it transponder off, out in the Westtoward Ohio and begins a left turn back toward the East.
At 9:49, FAA reports that Delta 89, which had been reported as missing, isnow reported as a possible hijacking so
again, he is.... I'm sorry 9:41.  Againhe is in the system.  He is kind of a red herring for us.


Now the only thing that I would point out on this chart is that this says9:43, American Airlines 77 impacts the Pentagon
(shown in simulation, above). The timeline on the impact on the Pentagon was changed to 9:37.  9:43 is thetime it was
reported that day.  It was the time we used.  And it took about twoweeks to discover in the parking lot of the Pentagon
this entry camera for theparking lot, which happened to be oriented toward the Pentagon at the time ofimpact.  And the
recorded time is 9:37.  And that's why the timeline went from9:43 to 9:37 because it is the best documented evidence
for the impact timethat we have.
Getting toward the end now, 9:47 is when Delta 89 clears the system bylanding in Cleveland.  So he is not a hijack.
Lots of things are going on now inthe system as the Sectors begin to call both units that are part of FirstAirforce and
NORAD as well as units that have nothing to do with us.  We arebeginning to call everyone now and the 103rd Air
Control Squadron, for instance,stationed in Connecticut is an Air Control Squadron, a radar squadron, and theygot their
radar online operational and begin to link their radar picture intothe Northeast system.  They are not normally part of
NORAD.  This is really theinitial part of a huge push the rest of that day to link as many radars in onthe interior as we
can, and to get as many fighters on alert as we can.
At 10:02, United 93, last radar data and the estimated impact time for United93 is 10:03.
At 10:07, FAA reports that there may be a bomb on board 93.  That's fourminutes after the impact.
At 10:15, they report that it's crashed and you can see now the fog andfriction lag time has increased from 7 minutes to
9 minutes to 15 minutes becauseof the level of activities that are going on.
And there are notations here about other airplanes as we begin to divertother airplanes that are just out intended for
training that day.  We're pickingup the phone, calling Syracuse the Air National Guard.  They are beginning toget
flights airborne.  They are beginning to arm those aircraft with whateverweapons they have handy so we can posture
that defense.
That is how the timeline unfolded.  As you can see, there is a fabric ofinterwoven actions, which is not just a linear
event.  So lots of things going on,lots of activities, lots of CQ centers.  Sir, that concludes my piece.


Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Mr. Chairman, we thought, right up front, we'd put that on the record so thatwe could have that as a departure point for
your questions. I again caveat bysaying that this is the North American Aerospace Defense Command andContinental
NORAD Region timeline.  Other agencies may have other logs that may havedifferent times.  But this is the best and
most accurate data that we couldpiece together for your Commissioner, sir.  With that, I open up to questions.
Thomas Kean, Committee Chairman
Thank you very much.  Commissioner Ben-Veniste?
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Good morning Gentlemen.  First I would like to personally commend each of youand the dedicated men and woman
who serve our nation through NORAD.  I'd liketo explain to you what you probably know already and that is that our
mandateas the Commission is to provide the most detailed and accurate exposition inour final report of what occurred
leading up to the 9/11 tragedy and theevents subsequent thereto.  And so, please understand that our questions may
bevery pointed.  We mean no disrespect but we have our mission, as well. Now, Gen.McKinley, is it fair to say that the
mission and the primary responsibility ofNORAD is to defend our homeland and our citizens against air attack?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
On the day of September 11, 2001, our mission was to defend North America, tosurveil, to intercept, to identify and if
necessary to destroy those targets,which we were posturing were going to come from outside our country.  Infact, that
tracks originating over the landmass of the United States wereidentified friendly by origin. Therefore, those alert sites
that were positioned onthe morning of September 11th, were looking out, primarily on our coasts at theAir Defense
Identification Zone which extends outwards of 100 to 200 miles offour shore.  So that was the main focus of NORAD
at the time.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
I asked you about your responsibility, Sir.  And I ask you again whether itwas not your responsibility as NORAD to
protect the United States and itscitizens against air attack?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
It is and it was and I would just caveat your comment by saying that ourmission was, at that time, not designed to take
internal FAA radar data, to trackor to identify tracks originating within our borders.  It was to look outwardas a Cold
War vestige, primarily developed during the Cold War to protectagainst Soviet long-range bomber penetration of our
intercept zone.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well I think Sir, you have used a good term - not good for the United Statesbut accurate, in terms of the vestigial
mandate operationally to look outwardtoward the borders rather than inward.  And by vestigial, you mean I'm sure,as a
result of our decades of confrontation with the former Soviet Union.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Correct, Sir.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
And so, on the day of September 11th, if you can see these dots, I know itmay be difficult to see, NORAD was
positioned in a perimeter around the UnitedStates but nothing in the central region, nothing on the border with Canada.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
That's correct, Sir.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Now let me ask you sir, whether the concept of terrorists using an airplaneas a weapon was something unknown to the
intelligence community on September10th, 2001?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Very good question...
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Thank you.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
And I asked our staff to provide me some data on what they had that morning. As I said, Gen. Arnold was at the helm
that morning.  But basically, thecomments I received from my staff was that there was no intelligence indication atany
level within NORAD or DOD of a terrorist threat to commercial aviationprior to the attacks.  And information from the
daily Joint Chiefs IntelligenceReport on the morning of September 11th indicated no specific dangers orthreats within
the country.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
My question Sir, and I mean no disrespect but we will save time if you'lllisten to what ask you.  My question is: the
concept of terrorists usingairplanes as weapons was not something which was unknown to the U.S.
Intelligencecommunity on September 10th, 2001. Isn't that fair to say?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
I would like the Intelligence community to address that.  I would find ithard to believe that they hadn't speculated
against that. But it was unavailableto us at the time.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, let's start for example with September 12th, 1994.  A Cessna 150Lcrashed into the south lawn of the White
House barely missing the building andkilling the pilot.  Similarly, in December of 1994, an Algerian armed
Islamicgroup in Paris hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash itinto the Eiffel Tower. In
October of 1996, the Intelligence communityobtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane
over Israeland crash it into Tel Aviv.  In August of 1998, the Intelligence communityobtained information that a group
of unidentified Arabs planned to fly anexplosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center.
Theinformation was passed on to the FBI and the FAA.
In September of 1998, the Intelligence community obtained information thatOsama bin Laden's next operation could
possibly involve flying an aircraftloaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it.  In August 2001,
theIntelligence Community obtained information regarding a plot to either bombthe U.S. Embassy in Nairobi from an
airplane or crash an airplane into it.
In addition, in the Atlanta Olympics, the United States government and theDept. of Justice and my colleague Jamie
Gorelick were involved in planningagainst possible terrorist attacks at the Olympics, which included the potential ofan
aircraft flying into the stadium.  In July 2001, the G8 Summit in Genoa,attended by our President - among the measures
that were taken, werepositioning surface-to-air missiles, ringing Genoa, closing the Genoa airport andrestricting all
airspace over Genoa.  Was not this information, Sir, available toNORAD as of September 11th, 2001?


Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
It's obvious, by your categorization that those events all took place andthat NORAD had that information.  I would only
add, Sir, that the intelligencedata that we postured our forces for and the training, and the tactics, and theprocedures
that we used to prepare our missions for support of the CombatantCommander of NORAD, had hijacking as a primary
intercept tactic.  And we havesome of the finest fighter pilots as you know in the world who are some of thebest people
in the world, who can do their mission extremely well. But we hadnot postured, prior to September 11th, 2001, for the
scenario that took placethat day.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, obviously, it would be hard to imagine posturing for the exact scenariobut isn't it a fact, Sir, that prior to
September 11th, 2001, NORAD hadalready in the works, plans to simulate in an exercise, a simultaneous hijacking
oftwo planes in the United States.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Col. Scott, do you have any data on that?  I'm not aware of that, Sir.  I wasnot present at the time.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
That was operation Amalgam Virgo.
Col. Alan Scott
Yes, Sir.  Specifically, operation Amalgam Virgo, which I was involved inbefore I retired, was a scenario using a
Third-World United, not United,uninhabited aerial vehicle launched off a rogue freighter in the Gulf of Mexico.
General Arnold can back me up, at the time, one of our greatest concerns was theproliferation of cruise missile
technology and the ability for terroristsgroups to get that technology and get it close enough to our shores to launch it.
In fact, this exercise, in this exercise we used actual drone, MQM 107 drones,which are about the size of a cruise
missile to exercise our fighters and ourradars in a Gulf of Mexico scenario.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
You are referring to Amalgam '01, are you not?
Col. Alan Scott
Yes, Sir.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
I'm referring to Amalgam '02, which was in the planning stages prior toSeptember 11th, 2001, Sir.  Is that correct?
Col. Alan Scott
That was after I retired and I was not involved in '02.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Will you accept that the exercise involved a simultaneous hijacking scenario?
Col. Alan Scott
I was not involved in '02.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, I do have some information on '02, if you would allow me to read it forthe record?
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Please.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Amalgam Virgo, in general, '02, was an exercise created to focus on peacetimeand contingency NORAD missions.
One of the peacetime scenarios that is andhas been a NORAD mission for years is support to other government
departments. Within this mission falls hijackings.  Creativity of the designer aside,prior to 9/11, hijack motivations
were based on political objectives, ie: asylumor release of captured prisoners or political figures.  Threats of
killinghostages or crashing were left to the scriptwriters to invoke creativity andbroaden the required response for
players.


Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, isn't that a bit fatuous given the specific information that I've givenyou?  It wasn't in the minds of scriptwriters
when the Algerians had actuallyhijacked a plane which they were attempting to fly into the Eiffel Tower andall the
other scenarios which I've mentioned to you.  I don't mean to arguewith you but my question is, Sir, given the
awareness of the terrorists' use ofplanes as weapons, how was it that NORAD was still focusing outward inprotecting
the United States against attacks from the Soviet Union or elsewhere andwas not better prepared to defend against the
hijackings scenarios of acommercial jet, laden with fuel, used as a weapon to target citizens of the UnitedStates?  When
you say, our training, our mission was vestigial, I think you saidit in capsulated form but would you agree that on the
basis of theinformation available, that there could have been better preparedness by NORAD to meetthis threat?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
In retrospect, Sir, I think I would agree with your comment.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
With respect to the bases that were available for protecting the East Coast,and Col. Scott has gone through the
scrambling of aircraft, I want to focusjust on one flight, Flight 77, and then, Secretary Lehman will ask you some
morespecific questions.  With respect to Flight 77, Sir, you testified previouslybefore the House Armed Services
Committee and you were - I'm sorry, GeneralEberhart was questioned.  You are familiar with his testimony, Sir?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Yes Sir.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Okay.  He was questioned about Flight 77 and because of the use of LangleyAirbase, which is 105 miles from our
Capitol, as opposed to say Andrews AirForce Base, which is in the neighborhood, the question arises again about
thepositioning and the thought behind the positioning of fighter planes to protectour Capitol in an enhanced terrorist
threat situation, such as existed onSeptember 10th, September 9th, 2002.  Let me ask you about Flight 77 again.
Thequestion was, the timeline that we've been given is that at 8:55 on September11th, American Airlines Flight 77
began turning east, away from it's intendedcourse and at 9:10, Flight 77 was detected by the FAA radar over West
Virginia,heading east.  That was after the two planes had already struck the Trade Centertowers.  Is that correct Col.
Scott?
Col. Alan Scott
Yes Sir
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Now, 15 minutes later at 9:25, the FAA notified NORAD, according to thestatement, that Flight 77 was headed toward
Washington.  (reading from the record)
"Was that the first notification at 9:25 that NORAD or DOD had that Flight 77was probably hijacked?  And if it was,
do you know why it took 15 minutes forthe FAA to notify NORAD?"
General Eberhart said, "Sir, there is one minor difference, I showed it as9:24 which you do as well that we were
notified and that's the firstnotification that we received."
"Do you know if that was the first notification to DOD?"
"Yes, Sir, that's the first documented notification that we received"
And I want to focus on the word "documented" because it's very important forus to know when NORAD actually
received notification given the fact that theplanes had already crashed into the World Trade Center and given, I'm sure,
theassumption that these were terrorist acts and there could be more coming,more planes coming. Is it, in fact correct
Sir that the first notification of anytype that NORAD received was not until 9:24 with respect to Flight 77?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
With your concurrence Sir, I would like to ask Gen. Arnold to address that. He was on the floor that morning.
Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
The simple answer to your question is that I believe that to be the fact. That 9:24 was the first time that we had been
advised of American 77 as apossible hijacked airplane.  Our focus, you've got to remember, that there is a lotof other
things going on simultaneous here, was on United 93, which was beingpointed out to us very aggressively, I might say,
by the FAA.  Because ourradar is looking outward and not inward, the only way for us to know whereanything was for
the FAA to pass along that information to us.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Is it not the case, Gen. Arnold, that there was an open line establishedbetween FAA, NORAD and other agencies,
including CIA and FBI that morning?
Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Well, I wasn't on that line at that particular time if that were the case. In fact, there was an open line established
between our sectors at really thetactical level where they're controlling the aircraft, talking to the FAAcontrollers from
time-to-time.  We did not have an open line at that time with theFAA.  That is not accurate.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
You did not.  You were not, NORAD was not in contact by...
Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
The Continental United States NORAD region, my headquarters, we areresponsible for the Continental United States
air defense, did not have an open linewith the FAA at that time.
Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Was there some NORAD office that had an open line with the FAA (crosstalk). Excuse me, let me finish my question,
please.  Was there some NORAD office,and you'll forgive us because we had asked for this information prior to
thehearing from FAA and did not receive it.  But we are advised that there wasindeed an open line between either the
net or some other name given to aessentially an ongoing conference, whereunder, in real-time, FAA was
providinginformation as it received it, immediately after the first crash into the towers, weare told, with respect to each
of the events that were ongoing of any remarkablenature.  I see Gen. McKinley is nodding.
Indeed, there was an open line at one point between Air Defense officials inthe Northeast Sector of the US and
NORAD. That story and the rest of thetestimony from May 23, 2003, coming up soon.